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ARGUMENT
After review of the three Appellee's Briefs filed herein, Geri Pasquin believes that her
Appellant's Bncl sn Ulcicnl l'\ a.Mi esses lin main arguments. However, Mrs. Pasquin will
address certain issues in each brief which she believes are nr>N.
I.

• Reply to Pasquin-Oualitv Parts' Brief. The Pasquin-Quality Parts Brief is

unpersuasivi- foi llir follow
(a)

IMI>

nrasons;

The Brief sets forth a. statement of facts which is in tvulcidicf ion w illi llic lad" sel Ini Hi
in IVlrs. I'asqmn 's Statement of Undisputed Facts - these defendants seem to forget that
the facts

. ...

,o the party opposing the motion

for summary judgment; further, these motions really starlit I sin* v thr • • *
motions joined in the Estate's initial motion) as motions for judgment on the pioadings ~
such that the allegations in Mrs PiisqniN s t oiiiin.iiiii were required to be deemed to be
true;
1 IK.1 Bnci argues that even it Mrs, Pasquin can identify and urge an exception to the
Statute of Frauds with respu I In lite-time iiuploviuuil ludgc hedencks found that no
reasonable iur\ could haw- found
•"W_I : :c

.

JM

employment for life agreement; hut il llus is <INII.II

.ruiiL;; of law he was wrong and this Court should reverse

because (i) it is entirely understandable and eona:i\ altlc Hwil koi \ Pasqum promised and
his mother n^cptrd ar enu^n men* u \ life aureemem -\itl; v^ualuy Parts and the
Corporate

. ^ i icaa^ k* improperly vreighed the e\ idencx

(John Pasqum ^ aiTida\it against Mrs. Pa .v.'--. * -

moment u3

Disputed Facts) at the summary judgment stage of this ease ~ which is not proper and
1

requires reversal;
The Brief argues for the first time that Mrs. Pasquin's sworn Statement of Disputed Facts
was evidentiarily insufficient to defeat the movants' claims — arguing, without any
specific examples, that they are conclusory and evidentiarily inadmissible; however, not
only is this the first time that this argument has ever been raised, but it is simply incorrect
- Mrs. Pasquin's sworn testimony that she had conversations with Kory and John and that
in these conversations she was offered and promised that she would be a "partner," that
she became a partner "immediately," that John Pasquin was aware of and consented to
the offer that she be made a partner; that she was promised life-time employment, etc.,
are all evidentiarily proper and sufficient; it must be remembered that all inferences from
the statements of fact must be drawn in favor of Mrs. Pasquin;
The Brief props up the "straw man" argument that Mrs. Pasquin's claim of life-time
employment should be defeated because it involves an agreement to pay whether she was
physically able to work or not; the fact is that at all times relevant hereto Mrs. Pasquin
has been physically capable of working and it is John Pasquin who became injured and
now operates at an apparently diminished capacity; and, again, among partners and
family members, it is very believable that they agreed that a perquisite of their
partnership interest would be an employment contract providing for payment under very
liberal circumstances;
The Brief tries to side-step the fact that John Pasquin signed answers to interrogatories on
behalf of these defendants which admitted that Kory Pasquin had in fact promised, on
behalf of the partnership and then corporation, that Mrs. Pasquin would have employment
2

for life, by incredibly asserting that Mrs. Pasquin's claim that this promise was made is
not believable — how can they claim a promise which they admit in writing was in fact
made, is unbelievable?!?!
(f)

The Brief also makes an argument - again for the first time - that Mrs. Pasquin breached
the life-time employment agreement; but, even if she did temporarily quit as alleged in a
footnote in the brief, it is obvious that she came back to work and at the time of this
litigation up until she wasfiredafter the summary judgments were granted herein, she
was working;

(g)

The Brief acknowledges that partnerships can be oral, but makes a strange argument that
the oral partnership is "one at-will," which can be dissolved by any one of the partners
and then invites this Court to help them find some way to utilize this doctrine as grounds
to affirm; this is bizarre, to say the least, but should be rejected because there is nothing
in the record upon which this Court canfindthat the partnership which Mrs. Pasquin
alleges was created was somehow terminated; and, even if Mrs. Pasquin did temporarily
cease to come into work over some point of disagreement (which fact is not in the
record), this would not have constituted an election to dissolve the partnership but was
merely an employment dispute; and even if it were to be construed to be an election to
dissolve, she obviously came back to work, and everybody moved forward - so, there
must have been a reaffirmation of the partnership;

(h)

With respect to the computation of time, the Brief argues that once the mailing time of
three (3) days is added to afive(5) day time period, the sum of this is now eight (8) days
and holidays and weekends are no longer excluded; this argument should be rejected
3

because it defeats the purpose of the rules; if a proposed order is mailed rather than handdelivered to an opposing party, that mailing can often take the three days to arrive which means that the responding party literally still has only five days left to respond;
under these circumstances, since there still is literally only five days left to respond, the
rule excluding holidays and weekends should apply to give the responding party a
reasonable time within which to deal with the substance of the proposed order;
(i)

With respect to the Rule 56(f) motion, the Brief admits that John Pasquin was injured and
could not be deposed, but claims that Mrs. Pasquin could have pursued other discovery
but did not; this ignores the fact that John Pasquin is the key witness, besides Mrs.
Pasquin, on the issues involved herein - the attorneys were not likely to have been
present for the private and/or onsite meetings between Mrs. Pasquin, Kory and John on
these issues; furthermore, the only person, other than Mrs. Pasquin, knowledgeable of the
business records was Mr. Pasquin; the only meaningful discovery, therefore, could only
have been had from John Pasquin - and he was the witness who was unavailable; it is
disingenuous and unfair to assert otherwise;

(j)

Finally, the Brief does not address Mrs. Pasquin's assertion in article V of her
Appellant's Brief that most of her claims were unrelated to the Statute of Frauds and
should not have been dismissed summarily (see Appellant's Brief, pp. 35-36); the
dismissal of these claims should unquestionably be reversed.
II.

Reply to The Puffins' Brief. Mrs. Pasquin believes that the Puffins' Brief is

unpersuasive for the following reasons:
(a)

The Duffins' Brief makes the argument, similar to that made by the Pasquin-Quality Parts
4

Defendants, that an oral partnership may not be void under the statute offrauds,but is
terminable at will; the Brief goes on to argue that the formation of the corporation
constituted a dissolution; but, even if this is so, Mrs. Pasquin, as a partner as of the date
of said dissolution, is entitled to an accounting as to the assets of the partnership and to
recover her fair share thereof which was apparently transferredfraudulentlyby her
allegedly former partners to their allegedly separate corporation; her claims for relief,
including her alternative claims, could not have been entirely defeated by this argument;
The Duffins' Brief addresses Mrs. Pasquin's "partial performance" exception to the
statute offraudsby arguing that "partial performance of a contract within one year does
not take it out of the statute offrauds;"this argument demonstrates that these defendants
misunderstand this exception; under the cases cited by Mrs. Pasquin, the fact that the
parties continued to act as partners for year after year - even if by technical operation of
law the partnership could only be for a year at a time (which Mrs. Pasquin does not
acknowledge to be the law) - the exception provides that if the parties perform year after
year, the partnership will not be voided; it may be terminated at will, but it should not be
voided because in the face of the parties' substantial partial performance, voiding the
partnership that would be totally unfair and inequitable;
The Duffins' Brief attempts to argue that while the estoppel argument may apply to Kory
Pasquin's Estate and to the Pasquin-Quality Defendants, it should not apply to the
Duffins because they were not thefront-lineactors; but this argument must fail because
the Duffins' liability in part is a derivative of whether there was a partnership between
Mrs. Pasquin and Kory and John Pasquin; if there was a partnership - which cannot be
5

denied by the other partners pursuant to the application of the doctrine of estoppel - then
the Duffin attorneys have a problem because their client was a partnership which included
Mrs. Pasquin; their argument simply misses the mark;
(d)

The Duffins' Brief argues finally that they had no duty to Mrs. Pasquin on grounds other
than as a result of the application of the statute of frauds; this argument must be rejected
primarily because the Duffins' motion for summary judgment was a joinder with the
Kory Pasquin Estate's statute of frauds motion; Mrs. Pasquin's Appellant's Brief deals
with this argument, and how the facts need to be construed, in more detail and which
points will not be restated by Mrs. Pasquin here;

(e)

Finally, as with the Pasquin-Quality Defendants' Brief, the Duffins' Brief also is
completely silent with respect to Mrs. Pasquin's assertion, in article V of her Appellant's
Brief, that there were claims against these defendants which should not have been
dismissed even if the statute of frauds operates to defeat the partnership and employment
for life claims; for example, Mrs. Pasquin alleges that the Duffins induced the PasquinQuality Defendants to breach her employment at will agreement (if that is what the Court
determines it to be), and participated directly in the actions which intentionally inflicted
emotional distress upon Mrs. Pasquin; as argued in Mrs. Pasquin's Appellant's Brief at
pp. 35-36, these and other claims should not have been dismissed under any of the
motions.
HI.

Reply to the Estate of Kory Pasquin's Brief. The Estate's Brief is unpersuasive

for the following reasons.
(a)

The Estate's Brief argues that the notice of appeal was untimely filed with respect to the
6

order on its motion for summary judgment; this matter w as mi sal in a motion for
summary disposition, which was denied; Mrs. Pasquin's memorandum in opposition
thereto is attached hereto as Addendum A, and the arguments setforththerein in
opposition to this point are incorporated herein in irlulaiioii of ilie Estate's position
(b)

The Estate's Brief then sets forth a peculiar narrative concerning "Boy Scout principles,"
and otluM matter "•

-qu11» docs not believe that this narrative refutes the arguments

she presents in her brief and will stand on the same;
(c)

Finally, again Mrs. Pasquin's assertion on pp. 35-36 of her Appellant's Brief that claims
outside the application ul statutes ol limitations should not have been dismissed w as
wholly ignored by the Estate's Brief.
CONCLUSION
Based upon 1'ie fore^om).' plumtill appellant hen Pasquin respectfully requests that this

Court (1) reverse Judge Frederick's orders granting summary judgmeni in fa\ i n * »i tlu- defendants
in linn cntiret>, or l }) reverse that portion of Judge Frederick's orders granting summary
judgment as to the claims not automatical^

-^ u

- rauds challenge, or (3)

reverse Judge Frederick's ruling regarding the timeliness of objections and the computation
time with respect tlieieto,, aiicfot f 41 ul (lie very least, set aside the orders granting summary
judgment, find that Mrs. Pasquin's Rule 56(f) motion should have been gi unlet!, and di lectin^
Ihat I! ii; motions not be ruled upon until the requested relevant discovery is completed and Mrs.
Pasquin has had an opportunity to supplemeni IHT oppositions -teeordnifjly
DATED this 29th day of January, 1999.
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Brian W. Steffensen, P.C., (#3092)
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2159 South 700 East, Suite 100
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Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
i !H<I I1 ASQI 11H,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Appellant's Opposition to the Pasquin
Estate's Motion for Summary
Disposition

vs.
JOHN PASQUIN, JIMMIE PASQUIN,
THE ESTATE OF KORY PASQUIN,
QUALITY PARTS, a Utah general
partnership, QUALITY TRANSPORT
REFRIGERATION PARTS, INC., THOMAS
A. DUFFIN, DANIEL O. DUFFIN,

No. 970612
970900011CV

Defendants/Appellees

The mot:
1.

summary disposition should be denied because:

Although the Court entered separate orders ioi eaeh yroup ot defendants, they all

joined in the same motion, such that the time for appeal did not begin to run until the final order
on the "joined" motion for summai y judgment was entered;
2.

Although the Pasquin Estate's form of order contained language w Inch »a:m\ u >

a»tnpl\ wiih Rule '»4( h), ihe trial court was never asked to, nor did it specifically, find the items
required in Rule 54(b); and
3.

The appeal herein certainly does raise substantial issues which are in dispute ami

require determin<ilitMI

Statement of Facts
1.

The Pasquin Estate filed a motion for summary judgment on or about August 29,

1997. No where in the motion or memorandum in support did the Pasquin Estate ask the court to
make thefindingsrequired under Rule 54(b) to make the judgment thereon "final."
2.

The Plaintiff/Appellant filed an opposing memorandum, and then the Pasquin

Estate filed a Reply — which again did not ask the court to make the findings which under Rule
54(b) are required to make the judgment thereon "final."
3.

On or about September 9, 1997, the Duffins filed a Motion & Memorandum in

which they stated that they "hereby joined in and adopted the arguments of the Estate of Kory
Pasquin in its Motion for Summary Judgment."
4.

On or about September 25,1997, the remainder of the defendants (the Pasquin

Related Entities) filed a Motion and Memorandum for summary judgment in which they stated
that they also "hereby incorporate and adopt the arguments of the Estate of Kory Pasquin in its
Motion for Summary Judgment...."
5.

The Plaintiff/Appellant filed additional memoranda in opposition to these two

joining motions, incorporating by reference prior memoranda in opposition, and stating that the
later memoranda were also offered in opposition to the prior, joined motions.
6.

Surprisingly, without hearing argument, the Court started ruling on the motions as

if they were separate motions — rather than joined motions. As indicated in the Docketing
Statement herein, orders were entered as follows:
a.

The Pasquin Estate's summary judgment was granted on October 21,

b.

The Pasquin Related Entities' summary judgment was granted on

1997;

November 3,1997; and
c.

The Duffins' summary judgment was first signed on November 17, 1997,

and Ihen ametulni nn November ,?(>, I1'1']
7.

The Pasquin Estate slipped language in its proposed order which appears to satisfy

Rule 54(b) -- but the issues were never properly raised, nor was the trial court given an
opportunity to consider, after briefing, the .ippiopnatenes.s ul'niakmg lik- requisite delcrmiiution.
8.

The Notice of Appeal was filed December 12,1997.
Argument

• Timeliness of Notice of Appeal Unless a proper R I lie 54(b) determination is made, the
time for filing an appeal does not begin to run until after the last order disposing of all of the
issues relating In .ill parlies has been enleas!

Ihe proverbial '"tinal" judgment or order. See

Reed v. Reed, 806 P. 2d. 1182 (Utah 1991). In this case, there are two reasons wh> the last • it: cier
— November 26, 1997 — should be considered the "final" order: (1) The motions were
inextricably linked, such that the> cannot be considered sepai ate motions

and the summary

judgments granted in connection therewith cannot be considered separate and were not finally
granted I iiitll the last order; and (2) Rule 54(b) was not in fact followed and complied with.
The motions were all joined, such that it may ni tail haw been procedumlK iiuppiu|>niite
for Judge Fredericks to have issued separate orders treating the motions as separate. Since they
all raised the idrnln ,il issue, il i eilainl' was reasonable and appropriate for the
Plaintiff/Appellant to wait until the last order on the joined motions was entered to file her
appeal It was premature for Judge Fredericks to issue an order on one motion, when the other,
"joined motions," were still pending and beinj? briefed
Rule 54(b) requires more than just slipping language in a proposed order which appears

to satisfy the rules' requirements. An earlier order or judgment is to be treated as "final," prior
to a literally final order in a case, "only upon an express determination by the court that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence
of such determination and direction," the order in question is not a final order. See Rule 54(b);
Reed v. Reed, supra (an order was not found to be a "final" order because "no Rule 54(b) motion
was made requesting the court to certify the amended default judgment... as final"). The trial
court cannot make this express determination without being requested to do so pursuant to a
"Rule 54(b) motion ... requesting the court to certify the amended default judgment... as final,"
to quote the Reed Court, and the party opposing such a determination being given an opportunity
to present its opposition, if any, to the same. The Pasquin Estate never made such a motion, nor
in any other way did it specifically ask Judge Fredericks to make the required determinations.
There was no motion, no briefing, no evidence, nor any argument whatsoever on the issue. Rule
54(b) was not satisfied.
Further, this is not the situation in which such a Rule 54(b) finding is usually made. In
this case, there were several parallel, almost identical, orders in process of being entered, all of
which related to exactly the same issues raised in a "joined" motion. This was not a situation
where, as to one party, the issues were distinct and unrelated to the issues affecting the other
parties such that a separate appeal as to that party should be allowed to commence. In this case,
there were almost identical, "joined," motions. This was not a situation where it would have
been appropriate for the Court to make Rule 54(b) findings. To the contrary. This is a case
where judicial economy demanded that the appeal time not run until the last of the joined,
identical, motions was ruled on. Otherwise, multiple notices of appeal would be required raising
exactly the same issues.

The truth is that Judge Fredericks never in fact consciously made the required Rule 54(b)
determinations, and the Pasquin Estate's supposed "final judgment" should not be considered
"final" under Rule 54(b).
The Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests, therefore, that this Court rule that under
these circumstances Rule 54(b) was not met and/or is not applicable, that the order on November
26,1997 was the final order, and that the Notice of Appeal was timely.
THE APPEAL MOST DEFINITELY RAISES SUBSTANTIAL
ISSUES NEEDING REVIEW.
Mrs. Pasquin, With the Knowledge and Consent of John Pasquin, Became a Partner
Immediately in the Partnership - the Statute of Frauds Does Not Even Apply. There
certainly can be oral partnerships — most partnerships are oral. Further, most partnerships exist
and operate over a period of years. If an oral partnership were always void under the statute of
frauds because it contemplated being in business and operating for more than a single year,
almost no oral partnership agreement would be enforceable. Which is why it is mind boggling
that the Pasquin Estate prevailed on a claim that the Statute of Frauds precluded Mrs. Pasquin's
attempts to enforce her oral partnership interest.
The Pasquin Estate seems to recognize the weakness in this argument, and in the motion
for summary disposition tries to argue — inaccurately — that Mrs. Pasquin did not become a
partner — immediately ~ in the partnership because John Pasquin did not consent thereto
(apparently conceding that there would be substantial testimony from witnesses confirming Kory
Pasquin's promises to Mrs. Pasquin that she would be, and did become, a partner in Quality
Parts). The Pasquin Estate must lose on this point because Mrs. Pasquin specifically asserted in
her statements of disputed facts in connection with the joined motions for summary judgment

that John Pasquin was aware of Kory Pasquin's promises in these regards, and that John Pasquin
expressly consented to Mrs. Pasquin becoming a partner in Quality Parts. For the purposes of
this motion, the court must assume these facts to be true. If assumed to be true, Mrs. Pasquin
most certainly did become a partner — immediately upon promise and acceptance — in Quality
Parts and her appeal should not only proceed forward, but should be granted.
Guranteed Employment For Life Is Enforceable. The Pasquin Estate attempts to
argue that an oral promise of employment for life can never, as a matter of law, be enforceable.
But this simply is not true. Mrs. Pasquin's memoranda in opposition to the joined motions for
summary judgment cited cases and exceptions to the rule. (See Mrs. Pasquin's various
memoranda in opposition to the three joined motions, where are incorporated herein by
reference). Since there can be exceptions, and Mrs. Pasquin alleged them and the facts
supporting them, the matter should have gone to trial to determine if the factual requisites to
support the exceptions were present. Judge Fredericks erred in ignoring these exceptions and
that there were factual disputes as to whether they were applicable in this case. The motion for
summary disposition is inaccurate in this regard and should be denied.
For example, Mrs. Pasquin cited the trial court to the answers to interrogatories of John
Pasquin, Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc., where
these defendants admitted being aware of the promise of life-time employment, and specifically
reaffirmed that promise and commitment. This answer to interrogatory was (a) a writing, (b)
signed by John Pasquin for himself and the partnership and corporate defendants, which (c)
expressly acknowledged the promise of life-time employment as follows:
"John is aware that Kory, out of that concern, would assist Plaintiff as much as he
could in order to assure that Plaintiff would have employment with the Defendants'
business as long as Plaintiff so desired and was able to perform her duties. Defendants

are unaware of any of such communications being reduced to writing. Further, shortly
after Kory's death in October, 1996, the parties met at Defendant Duffins' office. Also
present were Dennis Welker, Boyd Simper and Julie Flarrity (Plaintiffs daughter from a
prior marriage). At the meeting, Ms. Flarrity stated that she was present to assure that the
Plaintiff... got her fair share of the company.' John Pasquin stated that he was aware of
and would honor Kory Pasquin's desire to provide employment for Plaintiff as long as
she wanted it."
(Defendants' John Pasquin, Jimmie Pasquin, Quality Parts, a Utah
general partnership, and Quality Transport Refrigeration Parts, Inc., Answers to
Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories, Request for Admission & Request for Production
of Documents, Answer No. 7)
These facts were undisputed, yet Judge Fredericks did notfindthat there was a writing which
took the promised life-time employment out of the statute of frauds. This was reversible error.
Further, this writing most definitely constituted "evidence" that the employer did "convey
a clear and unequivocal intention" to agree to grant her life-time employment as she alleged, as
required by Sanderson v. First Security Leasing Co., 844 P. 2d 303 (Utah 1992). These facts
were vigorously argued in the oppositions to the joined motions. Mrs. Pasquin met her burden of
setting forth facts which disputed the Pasquin Estate's summary judgment and which should have
entitled her to a trial on the claims raised in her complaint.
The docketing statement does, despite Mr. Copier's inaccurate assertions to the contrary,
recite the foregoing facts. The facts in the docketing statement, and in the statements of disputed
facts in the Plaintiff/Appellant's various memoranda in opposition to the joined motions for
summary judgment, raised and supported all of the issues which Mrs. Pasquin asks this Court to
address — and which should have been more than enough to require a denial of the joined
motions to dismiss. This appeal is well taken and should ultimately be granted.

Conclusion
For all of these reasons, the Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests that the motion for
summary disposition be denied and that this appeal proceed forthwith.

DATED the 23rd day of November, 1998.

Brian W. Steffensen
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
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